Riba Rambles:
On Galvin and Shamos

The rules are different there

With one week to election day, irregularities in Florida are already making the news:

Several South Florida voters say the choices they touched on the electronic screens were not the ones that appeared on the review screen -- the final voting step.

Election officials say they aren't aware of any serious voting issues. But in Broward County, for example, they don't know how widespread the machine problems are because there's no process for poll workers to quickly report minor issues and no central database of machine problems.

<snip>

Debra A. Reed voted with her boss on Wednesday at African-American Research Library and Cultural Center near Fort Lauderdale. Her vote went smoothly, but boss Gary Rudolf called her over to look at what was happening on his machine. He touched the screen for gubernatorial candidate Jim Davis, a Democrat, but the review screen repeatedly registered the Republican, Charlie Crist. [...]

A poll worker then helped Rudolf, but it took three tries to get it right, Reed said.

"I'm shocked because I really want . . . to trust that the issues with irregularities with voting machines have been resolved," said Reed, a paralegal. "It worries me because the races are so close."

<snip>

Joan Marek, 60, a Democrat from Hollywood, was also stunned to see Charlie Crist on her ballot review page after voting on Thursday. "Am I on the voting screen again?" she wondered. "Well, this is too weird."

<snip>

Mauricio Raponi wanted to vote for Democrats across the board at the Lemon City Library in Miami on Thursday. But each time he hit the button next to the candidate, the Republican choice showed up. Raponi, 53, persevered until the machine worked. Then he alerted a poll worker.

Notice how all the reported problems involve people trying to vote for the Democrat, and their ballot registering the Republican?

Need I remind folks that Diebold is owned by Republican partisans, and back in 2003, the CEO said he was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President."

Did you happen to see Sunday's FoxTrot?

If not, here's an excerpt:

If we can't trust our ballots to give accurate results, where does that leave us?

---

PS (added 10:20): Oh look! Similar problems in Texas!

County Judge Carl Griffith said he pressed a button and made a choice on the touch-screen, but another option appeared.
 [...]
During the first week of early voting, several Jefferson County voters have told KFDM they selected one candidate, but instead, the opponent's name lit up.

And guess what, once again all reported cases involve Democratic votes turning Republican. (More instances) What are the odds!

By the way, for this reason I'm writing in Bonifaz (or, as I've nicknamed him, "Bunnyface") for Secretary of State. I can't believe anybody would be so stupid as to switch to Diebold voting machines this late in the game. But that appears to be what Galvin is doing in Massachusetts.

An open letter to Sec. Galvin: Registering my worry about Diebold voting machines

This is what I emailed to elections@sec.state.ma.us -- I'm not sure that that is the right email address to use, so we'll see/

****

I'm a resident of Melrose, and I have heard that Sec. Galvin is considering using Diebold voting machines on a trial basis in a few districts on Nov. 7th, with an eye to a larger use in the future.

I am extremely uncomfortable with this.

The more we find out about Diebold voting machines, the more clear it becomes that they are not designed appropriately for such an important task.

As a matter of fact, although it sounds paranoid, I'm starting to suspect that they are actually deliberately designed to be "hackable".

They have many features that look good on paper, but, really, don't add any security.

One example of this is that the box they're in locks, because you obviously need to give some physical security. And that looks good on paper.

But the lock they use is a standardized lock that you use on, for instance, hotel mini-bars, and all the keys are interchangeable. So you can go to a hotel, take the mini-bar key, and unlock any Diebold voting machine.

Their computerized security is basically the same, although it's more technical and therefore harder to understand. But the machine is like that all the way through, from stem to stern, so much so that I can't help but wonder if it was designed to be like that.

And now the Miami Herald is reporting that, in early voting from Florida, there are a number of cases where people are trying to vote for Democrats and it is registering Republican.

In order for there to be a serious problem, you need two things: a system that can be dishonestly manipulated, and dishonest people to manipulate it.

I am frankly not too worried that we have that many dishonest people in charge of elections in Massachusetts, so I don't anticipate problems. But, still -- I think that elections are too important to even have the possibility of fraud. And the Diebold system seems to be deliberately designed to allow fraud.

I think that we in Massachusetts deserve a system of which we can be confident, a system that is resistant to fraud. Our paper ballots with little ovals that we fill in with marker is fraud-resistant, easy to use, simple, and robust. Touch-screen voting has many more things that can go wrong, as is always the case with computers. As you can tell from the fact that I'm emailing, I'm not against computers in principle -- I was a computer science major in college. I didn't do very well, but I am still friends with everyone I met then -- and all the professional computer programmers I know are deeply against Diebold touch-screen voting.

The more that someone knows about computers, the less confident they are with the Diebold machines. They are too aware of how much can go wrong.

So I urge the Secretary to give up the plan to use Diebold machines. Even if nothing goes wrong with the voting, I couldn't feel confident that the votes actually reflected the will of the voters. The problems with Diebold are so pervasive that I deeply feel that they should not be used in Massachusetts, at least not until the system is entirely redesigned to include true, robust, and trustworthy security.

Thank you for your time;

     - Ian Osmond
     <Address deleted>

cc: http://xiphias.livejournal.com

<untitled>

What do people know about Professor Michael Ian Shamos? I was just talking to Sec. Galvin's office, and they mentioned that Prof. Shamos is involved in their oversight and testing procedure. Looking up his papers, I see that he's got a lot of publications and experience with electronic voting and oversight, but, reading one of his papers, it seems. . . well, his writing doesn't really inspire me with confidence.

http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/paper.htm

That's one of his papers. His arguments are things like, "Well, China manages to steal elections even without electronic voting, so why should we be worried about people stealing elections WITH electronic voting?"

Famous Shamos

Last night, I blogged:

I can't believe anybody would be so stupid as to switch to Diebold voting machines this late in the game. But that appears to be what Galvin is doing in Massachusetts.

In response, Ian wrote Secretary of State Galvin an e-mail and called his office to complain.
Afterwards, Ian asked (emphasis mine):

What do people know about Professor Michael Ian Shamos? I was just talking to Sec. Galvin's office, and they mentioned that Prof. Shamos is involved in their oversight and testing procedure. Looking up his papers, I see that he's got a lot of publications and experience with electronic voting and oversight, but, reading one of his papers, it seems. . . well, his writing doesn't really inspire me with confidence.

http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/paper.htm

That's one of his papers. His arguments are things like, "Well, China manages to steal elections even without electronic voting, so why should we be worried about people stealing elections WITH electronic voting?"

I'd never heard of Shamos before, but this piqued my curiousity. So to whet my appetite for information, I went a-searching...

---

His CV includes such credentials as:

• Professor in the Institute for Software Research of the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University
• Former Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Privacy Technology
• From 1980-2000 and from 2004-present he has been statutory examiner of computerized voting systems for the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. From 1987-2000 he was the Designee of the Attorney General of Texas for electronic voting certification.

So, he's knowledgable, but what are his biases?

Unfortunately for the sanctity of Massachusetts elections (not to mention the states he's already working for), he's generally considered an E-voting advocate, known for pooh-poohing security concerns. Some go so far as to call him a corporate shill.

I don't even have to go to the blogs for this; just look at these excerpts from recent publications:

The Pittsburgh City Paper in mid-October:

A distinguished career professor in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University, Shamos is also among the most vocal defenders of computer balloting's security and accuracy. While allowing for deficiencies in both the technology and the testing process, he dismisses the concerns of many critics.
...
Shamos, [Avi Rubin, professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and technical director of its Information Security Institute] says, "is a minority of one or two" in having such confidence in the current state of electronic voting.

The latest issue of Fortune magazine:

"Diebold doesn't fully get it about security," [Shamos] says. "Their position every time somebody raises the prospect of insider manipulation of elections is, 'Are you telling me you think that these election officials would commit a felony?' And the answer is, 'Yes, that's what we're saying. They might commit a felony, and what is your system doing to prevent them?'"
Even so, Shamos doesn't completely buy the Princeton study. "What Felten found wasn't a bug in the software," he says. "It was a deliberate feature that comes from the need to be able to update the machines quickly."

He doesn't seem to be a total industry puppet. There have been occasions where he's refused to certify machines, but on-the-whole, he seems to have more faith in the companies.

The Washington Post in May:

Unlike many colleagues in his field, Michael I. Shamos, a computer science professor at Carnegie Mellon University who has worked on election issues for about 20 years, has not generally been seen as a friend of the activists.
In 2004, they assailed Maryland's decision to buy Diebold touch-screen machines and asked a court to stop the state from using them. Shamos testified that with a few additional steps, the machines could be used without problem, and the court agreed.
Now, Shamos wonders. He is confident in his testimony and believes most security holes can be plugged. But he wonders whether Diebold cares enough about security and the sanctity of elections.
"There's a broader philosophical question that's been worrying me more and more lately," Shamos said. "What are these companies really doing? They don't seem to have embraced the seriousness with which people in this country take their elections. It's been kind of an adversarial thing where companies want to make profits, and they just haven't spent enough time and energy designing secure systems."

He spoke even more strongly around that time to The NewStandard:

While this newly exposed security flaw is serious, Shamos said he is not at all surprised because Diebold has "a history of not paying attention to security."
"They just don't get it," Shamos told The NewStandard. "We've had many, many, many discussions. In fact, if you look at their public statements they've made in light of this revelation, it shows that they still don't get it."

And, yet despite these caveats, more recent comments still sound like an industry booster, and against further government regulation.

For example, I found a CNBC interview from early October, after the Princeton report of Diebold vulnerability. Blip.tv has made the 4-minute clip available online. The other guest, Warren Stewart, policy director of VoteTrustUSA. The following day, Stewart posted his reaction.
Voting advocate BradBlog snarked:

Shamos again threw up the tired red-herring that there's never been a verified instance of voting machine tampering. Correctly Stewart pointed out that the recent Princeton test proved that tampering can be done without anyone ever knowing about it. It's time for Shamos to find another diversion.

The latest news on VotePA.us: Election Integrity & Voting Rights in Pennsylvania deals with Shamos' role in recertification of Sequoia. The two observers paint a very disturbing picture:

Dressed in a colorful orange polka-dot tie and orange and white striped shirt, Shamos strolled about the exam room, posturing frequently in front of a large LCD projection of the screen under scrutiny newly added for those in attendance to observe. At one point he even rendered a mime of a bound Harry Houdini escaping from chains to make his point that locks on a voting machine do not equate with security. The effect was not so much of a thorough scientific examination, but rather that of a polished performance designed to show an audience how thoroughly the testing was being done.

[E]lection integrity activists know very well that experts have been able to demonstrate how to hack into some of the same vote machines that Shamos has approved for PA. Then when these security threats surface based on vulnerabilities that Shamos never tested for, he professes shock and grave concern.

Overall, Shamos seemed confident that there was adequate security to foil tampering with the tabulations of the kind that he tested for last March. Unfortunately, I can't say how he arrived at that conclusion. He went quickly and I may have missed it.

Notwithstanding Shamos' confidence, this observer left with a conflicting feeling that she had just seen a fine performance by a skilled showman, but many questions still remain unanswered about the stability and security of WinEDS and the Sequoia AVC Advantage.

Furthermore, I don't like the man's priorities.

Look at this quote from the August issue of CIO Insight:

Cost is perhaps the biggest reason why e-voting systems should be left alone, says Carnegie Mellon's Shamos. Since much of the HAVA funds have already been spent, there is little money left to make the systems more secure. And, he says, "the public doesn't want to pay for voting machines. If you ask people if they want a secure election, they say of course. But ask them to give up some of the highway or school budget to pay for it. It's not going to happen."
[Attorney Lawrence] Norden disagrees. "There's nothing more fundamental to our democracy than making sure that votes are counted accurately. Choosing between schools and e-voting systems isn't a choice people should have to make," he says. At least 39 states agree with Norden, and they are beginning to scrutinize their e-voting processes, including how to instate audits and create a more thorough chain of custody

For now, I'll conclude with an older quote from a 2004 article in Chronicle of Higher Education, showing his general attitude:

Mr. Shamos dismisses many of the arguments used by critics of electronic and online voting as "purely emotional" and devoid of science. "If I give them a scientific explanation of why they are wrong," he says, "they simply ignore it." He characterizes the debate as "a shrieking match," in which detractors have gained the upper hand through a slick, well-organized public-relations campaign that falsely brands demurring voices as ignorant.
"You only hear the people who are yelling," he says. "You don't hear the silent majority."

That may be so, but most of the silent majority doesn't have the technical know-how or hacker mentality to evaluate the systems. Those who understand the issues are speaking out. And many people whose technical expertise I respect are among those expressing concern.

---

Does that answer your questions, Ian?

Votes count? Count votes!

So, I showed Ian my post on Shamos after he got home from bartending.

He pointed out that it looks like the guy is assuming what he's trying to prove.

Shamos seems to be relying upon the good intentions and competence of everybody else involved -- from the software companies to pollworkers.

In my mind, a well-designed voting system -- like a well-designed ATM or POS system -- should be built to operate in a hostile environment, when the most competent operators are crooks.

Bruce Schneier in May:

If you can't get the threat model right, you can't hope to secure the system.

---

My own observation is that while Shamos may be a professor in computer science, it seems clear that his experience is more academic than corporate.

There's a famous quote:

People who love sausage or respect the law should never watch them being made.

Shortly after I began working as a quality engineer, I realized that computer software belongs in that category as well.

I intend no slur against any company I've worked for, but once you see behind-the-scenes of the development process... Well, if you've never gotten a close look, you'd be shocked to know how much depends on compromises of duct tape, spit and baling wire to hold things together until the next release.

That's just the way things are done in the real world.

And even though I studied computer science in college, even though I worked tech support for four years, I never realized the extent to which this is true until I joined a development group.

In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. But, in practice, there is.

I don't think open source software is a universal panacea, but I do wish that we had open-source voting machines.

With so many knowledgable eyes able to view the code, it would make it that much harder to slip in anything malicious.

In the meantime, hard-copy voter-verified paper audit trails should be a minimum requirement.

For folks with HBO, they're airing a new documentary on electronic voting machines tonight -- called Hacking Democracy.

I want to move to theory. Everything works in theory.

BTW, since people keep comparing voting machines to ATMs, are there any good books on the development and growing social acceptance of ATMs?

Political hacks

One week before the election and voting machines are certainly making the news -- unfortunately, not in a terribly reassuring manner.

From today's Oakland Tribune:

Days before the election, state officials have learned that California's most widely used electronic voting machines feature a button in back that can allow someone to vote multiple times.

Several computer scientists said Wednesday that the vulnerability found in all touch-screen machines sold by Oakland-based Sequoia Voting Systems was not especially great because using the yellow button for vote fraud would require reaching far behind the voting machine twice and triggering two beeps.

Great, an external unsecured reset override button. Who came up with that bright idea?

Some counties were backing the machines up against walls; others were roping off the rear of the machines, state officials said.
"We train our poll workers to keep their eyes peeled, stay on the lookout for stuff like this. We think that will suffice."

And who watches the watchers?

Recognition of a potential new security problem that requires no knowledge of special passwords or access to the inner workings of a voting machine revives questions about the effectiveness of state and national evaluations of voting systems.
     <snip>
Sequoia's yellow button isn't a hack or flaw. The button has been a feature on Sequoia's mainline AVC Edge touch screens for years, designed as a backup for the typical method of voting on the machines.

In most counties, poll workers use a separate machine to activate a card that a voter inserts into the touch screen in order to retrieve the proper ballot. The yellow button is for counties that can't afford the separate machine or for cases when the card activator becomes inoperable, as happened to Diebold systems in March 2004 in Alameda and San Diego counties and last primary in Kern County.

Pressing, then holding the button for several seconds twice and answering a screen prompt sends the machine into a "manual activation" or "poll worker activation" mode. In that mode, someone can call up one ballot after another and vote them.

"You can literally vote continuously until you are physically restrained," said Watt, the former Tehama County poll worker who reported the problem to state elections officials.

Unlike the Diebold vulnerability, he said, using Sequoia's yellow button "takes no tools."

"In 18 seconds I can switch that to manual and start voting. In 30 seconds I can train you to do it," he said.

---

Back to Shamos, can somebody else fact-check this January article on Shamos' approval of Diebold for Pennsylvania?

It sounds damning, but the source is by no means objective, which is why I'd like other eyes to review it.

A few excerpts:

On December 13, 2005 in a test election conducted by Leon County Florida Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho, Finnish computer programmer Harri Hursti succeeded in altering the election results from a Diebold optical scan system undetectably, in spite of all the normal election security procedures.
     <snip>
Just after the new year an exchange took place involving representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of State, their consultant, Dr. Michael Shamos, Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University, and Diebold Election Systems intended to make it officially "okay" to certify the TSX touchscreen machines and the central count optical scan systems. The statements made in the report by Dr. Shamos display a deep misunderstanding of the Hursti Exploit, a disregard for the requirements of State and Federal law, and a willingness to accept unsubstantiated and disingenuous claims by Diebold with, at best, minimum independent corroboration.
     <snip>
Hursti exploited the fact that Diebold's software employs an "interpreted code" called AccuBasic. Interpreted code is quite appropriately prohibited by Section 4.2.2. of the Federal Election Commission's 2002 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2002 VVSG) to which they were certified by the ITA. This Federal certification is required as a prerequisite to state certification in 37 states, including California and Pennsylvania.
     <snip>
So if interpreted code allowed an election to be altered undetectably, it's a good thing it's prohibited, right? After all, it's a good idea to ensure that the software tested and approved during the qualification process can't be modified "on the fly" – as Hursti demonstrated. But wait, Pennsylvania certified Diebold anyway! How could they do that?

Meanwhile, I just found a 2004 article in The Nation with an even more disturbing insight into the man's priorities:

Michael Shamos of Carnegie-Mellon, who once warned that computerized vote-counting is highly vulnerable to fraud, now takes the position that "the issue is not whether voting systems are absolutely secure, but whether they present barriers sufficiently formidable to give us confidence in the integrity of our elections."

In other words, he's given up on trying to ensure security in favor of reassuring the public.

Says it all right there.

---

Finally, a few additional links for those interested in further reading:

• Bruce Schneier essay on the security of elections and voting machines
• A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting (PDF)
• Comparing the security of electronic voting machines with electronic slot machines
• Voting machines are apparently a major issue in California's election for Secretary of State. It's somewhat below the belt (imo), but get a load of this sensationalist commercial on the risks of electronic voting machines.

I'm mostly a dabbler in this subject (albeit one with a background in UI design and QA), so if you can recommend further sites/articles, please let me know.

Shame, shame, Shamos

So, I read thru A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting and want to quote a few paragraphs from the introduction:

In his article Paper v. Electronic Voting Records -- An Assessment, Professor Michael I. Shamos surveys a variety of objections to Direct Recording Electronic ("DRE") voting systems. While acknowledging and validating some of the most pressing, he breezily dismisses many others, often by packaging them as straw men or by impugning objectors' maturity, reasoning ability, or thoughtfulness. In so doing, Prof. Shamos sidesteps not only key technical issues, but also important issues of transparency, accountability, and the nature of the American democratic republic.
 <snip>
Shamos's errors are of two main types: philosophical and implementational.

Of the first class of error, Shamos seems to misconceive the proper role of citizens in a democratic republic. That role is not to accept the proclamations of government officials (or of the vendors they choose) on faith, but instead to treat them with a healthy, sustained skepticism. This role is particularly important on issues concerning the maintenance of the republic itself. And no issue is more central to that maintenance than the honest and accurate administration of elections, since they are citizens' chief means of control over the republic's course. Yet Shamos would make citizens prove that such systems are inaccurate and/or dishonest, rather than requiring their proponents to prove their accuracy and honesty by opening them to total public review and constant verification. This burden of proof inverts the proper role of the citizen from skepticism of government to faith in government, establishes a defective heuristic for evaluating systems or policies whose malfunctions can cause significant harm, and makes it unreasonably difficult to prove election fraud.

Shamos also appears confused about the essential nature of democratic republics themselves, writing

...I believe I and the republic will survive if a president is elected who was not entitled to the office....

It should be unnecessary to state that a "republic" whose Presidency is occupied by one not entitled to the office is, at least for that term of office, no longer a republic. It is a soft dictatorship run by those who maneuvered the illegitimate President into office. How such a "republic" can recover its legitimacy and standing via future elections is best left in the realm of theory; in the real world, an illegitimate Presidency is a disaster.

Of the second class of error -- the implementational error -- Shamos makes many, chiefly, it appears, through lack of imagination and through failure properly to consider motive. He variously underestimates the misdeeds a crooked vendor can accomplish and the importance of vendor error, fails to account for advances in technology that make (or will make) misdeeds easier to perpetrate, overestimates the efficacy of his own security prescriptions, and, in one case, even proposes an "ultimate" solution that actually makes the problem substantially worse.

The article goes on to detail with extensive footnotes the many errors in Shamos' paper.

This appears to be the same essay that Ian read.

Ian quoted this excerpt:

"It has been asserted that adding paper trails to DREs allows prompt detection of all of the possible intrusions discussed above. It is based on the mistaken belief that paper records are in some way more secure or free from tampering than electronic ones, which is not the case.
"On March 20, 2004, a presidential election was held in Taiwan. The winner by 29,518 votes (out of over 13 million cast) was the incumbent, Chen Shui-bian. To achieve this result, the Central Election Commission had to declare 337,297 ballots as invalid, more than 11 times the supposed margin of victory. The voting method was by paper ballot, and there weren't even any DRE machines to blame. Surely if the voters could rely on the paper ballots to be counted properly this result could not have occurred."

But the authors of this rebuttal point out an important fact Shamos neglected to mention:

Shamos implicitly blames the invalidity of 337,297 ballots cast in Taiwan's 2004 presidential election upon the use of paper ballots, saying, "Surely if the voters could rely on the paper ballots to be counted properly this result could not have occurred." He provides, however, no breakdown of the reasons behind the declarations of invalidity, and does not address the potential contribution of the "Million Invalid Ballot Alliance," which asked voters to reject both candidates by spoiling their ballots.

So, instead of representing a failure of the system, this was an intended choice of the voters.

---

Over the weekend, I'll create a specific dedicated page for these entries about Shamos from the last several days, so we can forward the criticisms to Galvin directly.

For anyone viewing a printout of this page, rather than the live website, here are the URLs linked from the posts above:

The rules are different there
 http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116235045119130299

irregularities in Florida

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/breaking_news/15869924.htm

Sunday's FoxTrot

http://www.gocomics.com/foxtrot/2006/10/29/

Similar problems in Texas

http://kfdm.com/engine.pl?station=kfdm&id=17367&template=breakout_dayportvideo.shtml

all reported cases

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3701#post-3701

More instances

http://www.bradblog.com/?cat=166

what Galvin is doing in Massachusetts

http://www.bluemassgroup.com/tag.do?tag=diebold

An open letter to Sec. Galvin
 http://xiphias.livejournal.com/355727.html

<untitled>
 http://xiphias.livejournal.com/355890.html

Famous Shamos
 http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116242892998590114

I blogged

http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116235045119130299

what Galvin is doing in Massachusetts

http://www.bluemassgroup.com/tag.do?tag=diebold

wrote Secretary of State Galvin an e-mail

http://xiphias.livejournal.com/355727.html

called his office

http://xiphias.livejournal.com/355890.html

Journal of Privacy Technology

http://www.jopt.org

The Pittsburgh City Paper in mid-October

http://www.pittsburghcitypaper.ws/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A19395

The latest issue of Fortune magazine

http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/13/8393084/?postversion=2006110111

The Washington Post in May

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/29/AR2006052900816.html

The NewStandard

http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/3180

Blip.tv has made the 4-minute clip available online

http://blip.tv/file/82126

VoteTrustUSA

http://www.votetrustusa.org

Stewart posted his reaction

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1844&Itemid=113

BradBlog

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3569

VotePA.us: Election Integrity & Voting Rights in Pennsylvania

http://www.votepa.us/

recertification of Sequoia

http://www.votepa.us/newsarchive/2006/10-11-06_SequoiaRexam.html

the August issue of CIO Insight

http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,2002514,00.asp

hacker mentality

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/09/what_is_a_hacke.html

Votes count? Count votes!
 http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116247175892091215

my post on Shamos

http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116242892998590114

Bruce Schneier in May

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/05/diebold_doesnt.html

Hacking Democracy

http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/hackingdemocracy/synopsis.html

Political hacks
 http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116248842346637820

Oakland Tribune

http://www.insidebayarea.com/oaklandtribune/localnews/ci_4588048

Susie Madrak

http://susiemadrak.com/2006/11/02/07/52/flaw-or-benefit/

this January article on Shamos' approval of Diebold for Pennsylvania

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=814&Itemid=113

altering the election results from a Diebold optical scan system undetectably

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=798&Itemid=51

Dr. Michael Shamos

http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/index.shtml

2002 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

http://www.eac.gov/election_resources/vss.html

a 2004 article in The Nation

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040816/dugger

Bruce Schneier essay on the security of elections and voting machines

http://www.opendemocracy.net/articles/ViewPopUpArticle.jsp?id=8&articleId=2213

A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting (PDF)

http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/shamos-rebuttal.pdf

Comparing the security of electronic voting machines with electronic slot machines

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2006/03/16/GR2006031600213.html

this sensationalist commercial

http://www.seeingtheforest.com/archives/2006/11/todays_voting_m_22.htm

Shame, shame, Shamos
 http://www.osmond-riba.org/lis/journal/2006_10_29_j_archive.htm#116252707917586290

A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on e-Voting

http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/shamos-rebuttal.pdf